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          NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1852 
___________ 
 
AKINTOYE OMATSOLA LAOYE, 
                                                Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-14-cv-05195) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 2, 2016 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 3, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Akintoye Laoye is a citizen of Nigeria who, at all times relevant to this case, was 
under electronic surveillance by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
Customs Enforcement (ICE).  In August 2014, Laoye filed a pro se complaint and motion 
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey.  In the complaint, Laoye alleged that he had been unable to 
undergo corrective jaw surgery in February 2014 because ICE had failed to respond to his 
requests to remove his electronic monitoring bracelet for the surgery.  Laoye named the 
United States as the sole defendant and sought relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680.  Laoye also claimed that “the agents of ICE  
. . . ignored his fundamental rights under the [C]onstitution.”  (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.)   
 In support of the complaint, Laoye attached a letter from a doctor stating that he 
could not wear his bracelet during the surgery.  Laoye also attached a copy of two 
complaints addressed to the Office of Inspector General as evidence that he had complied 
with the notice requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).  Lastly, he attached a February 2014 
letter from a social worker stating that he is being treated for anxiety and Post-traumatic 
Stress Disorder.    
 The District Court granted Laoye’s request to proceed IFP and screened the 
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1  Upon review, the District Court 
determined that Laoye had failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim under the 
FTCA.  See id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Specifically, the court noted that Laoye had failed to 
identify either the individual ICE agents who advised him or the dates on which they 
                                              
1 The District Court initially denied Laoye’s request to proceed IFP and dismissed the 
complaint, but Laoye later submitted a new IFP application and motion to reopen.  The 
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spoke, and had failed to set forth sufficient facts in support of his alleged injuries.  The 
court further noted that “it [was] not clear” whether he had complied with the FTCA’s 
notice requirement.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a).   
 The District Court then considered whether to afford Laoye a chance to cure the 
deficiencies in his complaint, but concluded that amendment would be futile.  See 
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a 
district court should not dismiss an IFP complaint without granting leave to amend unless 
“amendment would be inequitable or futile”).  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
noted that “the crux” of Laoye’s complaint was that his constitutional rights had been 
violated, and constitutional claims are not cognizable under the FTCA.  (Mem. Op. 4, 
ECF No. 5 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994).)  For this reason, the 
District Court dismissed the complaint without providing Laoye an opportunity to amend 
it.  Laoye now appeals from the District Court’s order.2   
 While we agree with the District Court that Laoye’s initial pro se pleading was 
insufficient, we cannot agree that Laoye could not include additional factual allegations, 
name more defendants, or introduce new causes of action to cure the deficiencies therein.  
See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 113-14; Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).  
For example, although the District Court correctly noted that constitutional claims are not 
                                                                                                                                                  
District Court reopened the matter and granted the IFP application.   
2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review of the District 
Court’s dismissal of Laoye’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B).  See Allah v. Seiverling, 
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).   
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cognizable under the FTCA, we see no reason why Laoye should not have been permitted 
to add individual defendants and facts to state a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. 
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  Similarly, Laoye’s allegations, if supported by 
additional facts, might state a plausible negligence claim under the FTCA.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b)(1).  Lastly, given that it was unclear from Laoye’s pleading whether he had 
complied with the FTCA’s notice requirements, he should be permitted to amend his 
complaint to address this concern.  
 Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand this matter 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
